

Interconnecting Smart Objects with Internet

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IKEv2 and Smart Objects

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AuthenTec

[draft-kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-minimal-00.txt](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-minimal-00.txt)

Example Use Case

- Garage door opener
 - Two buttons:
 - one to unlock and open door
 - another to close and lock the door
 - One led for feedback
 - Uses two-way radio communications
 - Obviously needs some kind of security
 - Battery powered



Example protocol

- Protocol can be very simple:
 - Send packet to server to start open/close door
 - Get packet back to acknowledge the command
 - Get status messages every second while door is moving
 - Get final message when operation is done
- Simple way would be to use WLAN / IP / UDP for communications
- Requires security
 - DTLS, Ipsec/IKEv2, proprietary

Protocol effects

- Device only wakes up when button is pressed
 - It always initiates the communication, it does not need to listen radio when it is sleeping, and it cannot reply to any messages while sleeping
- Device stays awake for some time after the button is pressed and if receives status packet blinks led and waits for more status packets.
- After certain timeout device goes back to sleep

What this means for IKEv2

- Device only needs work as IKEv2 Initiator
 - No need to work as IKEv2 Responder
- Only creates one IKEv2 SA and one IPsec SA
 - No need to support SA management operations like creating new IPsec SAs, rekeying, deleting SAs, etc.
- No need to do NAT-T, Configuration payloads, EAP authentication, Cookies, Multiple child SAs etc
- The server end would most likely be some kind of Home area network server (PC or similar).
- Pre-shared keys or RAW RSA keys authentication
 - No X.509 certificates

Authentication

- Pre-shared keys
 - Shared key printed on paper or in electronic form
 - Typed in to the home area gateway
- Raw RSA keys
 - Fingerprint of device is distributed as Pre-shared keys
 - Device imprints to first home area gateway it connects to
 - Some form of reset can be implemented to allow reimprinting

Implementation

- I created a prototype implementation of the minimal IKEv2 protocol usable for such scenarios and it took me less than a day to write the code and less than 1000 lines of perl source code.
 - I implemented sending ICMP Ping packet as didn't want to start writing server end to answer my requests...
- Implementing minimal IKEv2 is very simple compared to full implementation.
- There are some optimizations which can be done when only supporting minimal set of features.

Running code 1/2

Payloads

Init/Configuration

Running

ICMP send/response

IKE_INIT_SA/

IKE_AUTH

Headers generation

```
# Receive response
my($proto, $root, $found);

$root = '';
vec($in, fileno(SA), 1) = 1;
$found = select($root, $in, undef, undef, 10);
if ($found > 0) {
    my($pid, $euid, $iv, $smac, $sdpch);
    my($proto, $spad, $stype, $scode, $checksum, $id, $data);

    $addr = recv($SA, $packet, 1280, 0);
    die "Recv failed: $!" if ($addr ne undef);
    hexdump("Received esp packet", $packet);
}

# Remove IP header
$packet = substr($packet, 20);

# Check mac
$smac = substr($mac, substr($packet, 0, 12));
$spad = substr($packet, 0, 12);
$stype = substr($packet, 12, 1);
$checksum = substr($packet, 13, 2);
die "MAC check failed" if ($smac ne substr($packet, -12));
($splt, $spad, $iv, $smac) = unpack("NNNN", $packet);
die "Invalid SPI" if ($splt ne $spi);
die "Invalid MAC" if ($smac ne $mac($in));

$packet = substr($packet, 0, -12);
$cipher = new Crypt::RJindael($cipher);
$cipher->set_iv($iv);
$packet = $cipher->decrypt($packet);
hexdump("Decrypted esp packet", $packet);

$proto = ord(substr($packet, -1, 1));
$spad = ord(substr($packet, -2, 1));
$stype = ord(substr($packet, -3, 1));
$checksum = ord(substr($packet, -4, 2));
die "IP type" if ($proto != 4);
die "ESP type" if ($spad != 1);

# Remove IP header
$proto = ord(substr($packet, 9, 1));
$packet = substr($packet, 20);
$spad = substr($packet, 0, 1);
$stype = substr($packet, 1, 1);
$checksum = substr($packet, 2, 2);
die "Invalid icmp checksum" if ($checksum($packet) == 0);
($stype, $code, $checksum, $id, $seq, $data) = unpack("CCCCn", $packet);
die "No echo reply" if ($stype == 0);
hexdump("Received ICMP echo packet, type=$stype, code=$code");
$code = 0;
"chk = $checksum, id = $id, seq = $seq", $data);
} else {
    die "Receive timeout";
}
exit(0);

#####
#
# %$ipsec_params = ikev2(%$ikev2);

sub ikev2 {
    my($ikev2) = @_;
    $ikev2{IKE_SA_INIT_ID} = generate_ike_sa_init($ikev2);
    $ikev2{IKE_SA_INIT_ID} = do_exchange($ikev2, $ikev2, 0);
    $ikev2{IKE_SA_INIT_ID} = parse_ike_sa_init($ikev2, $ikev2{IKE_SA_INIT_ID});
    calculate_keys($ikev2);

    $ikev2{IKE_AUTH_ID} = generate_ike_auth($ikev2);
    $ikev2{IKE_AUTH_ID} = do_exchange($ikev2, $ikev2{IKE_AUTH_ID});
    parse_ike_auth($ikev2, $ikev2{IKE_AUTH_ID});

    return ipsec_params($ikev2);
}

#####
#
# Generate generic header
# $packet = generate_hdr($ikev2, $next_payload, $exchange_type, $flags,
# $message_id, $reat_of_packet);
# $flags, $message_id, $reat_of_packet);

sub generate_hdr {
    my($ikev2, $next_payload, $exchange_type, $flags,
    $message_id, $reat_of_packet) = @_;

    return pack("=Naaaa", $ikev2{esp_r}, $next_payload, 0x20, $exchange_type, $flags,
    $message_id, 28 + length($reat_of_packet), $reat_of_packet);
}

#####
#
# Generate generic header
# $packet = generate_gen_hdr($ikev2, $next_payload, $payload_data);

sub generate_gen_hdr {
    my($ikev2, $next_payload, $payload_data) = @_;

    return pack("=Naaaa", $next_payload, 4 + length($payload_data),
    $payload_data);
}

#####
#
# Generate payload (without generic header)
# $payload = generate_gen_payload($ikev2);

sub generate_ike_sa_payload {
    my($ikev2, $next_payload, $payload_data) = @_;

    return pack("=Naaaa", $next_payload, 4 + length($payload_data),
    $payload_data);
}

#####
#
# Generate payload (without generic header)
# $payload = generate_gen_payload($ikev2);

sub generate_ike_sa_payload {
    my($ikev2, $next_payload, $payload_data) = @_;

    $encr = AES-CBC-128 bit;
    $transforms = generate_gen_hdr($ikev2, 3, pack("Cnn", $encr,
    $transform));
    $transforms = generate_gen_hdr($ikev2, 3, pack("Cnn", $encr, 2, 2));
    $transforms = generate_gen_hdr($ikev2, 3, pack("Cnn", 3, 2));
    $transforms = generate_gen_hdr($ikev2, 3, pack("Cnn", 4, 2));
    $transforms = generate_gen_hdr($ikev2, 5, pack("Cnn", 1, 0, 4, $transforms));
    # 1st proposal, protocol IKE_SA, no SPI, 4 transforms
    return generate_gen_hdr($ikev2, 5, pack("Cnn", 1, 0, 4, $transforms));
}

# PRF PRF HMAC SHA1
$transforms = generate_gen_hdr($ikev2, 3, pack("Cnn", 2, 2));
# AH SHA1
$transforms = generate_gen_hdr($ikev2, 3, pack("Cnn", 3, 2));
# Diffie-Hellman 1024-gen MD5-SHA1
$transforms = generate_gen_hdr($ikev2, 3, pack("Cnn", 4, 2));
# 1st proposal, protocol IKE_SA, no SPI, 4 transforms
return generate_gen_hdr($ikev2, 5, pack("Cnn", 1, 0, 4, $transforms));
}

```

IKE_SA_INIT
packet

Running code 2/2

```

# Calculate IKE SA Keys
$keys = calculate_keys ($ike_sa);
my ($ike_sa, $keymat, $keymat_hex, $keymat_hex_hex, $keymat_hex_hex_hex);

$pub = "00" . unpack("B*", $IKEv2->[g_ike_sa][34][db->value]);
$g_ir = $IKEv2->[g_ike_sa]->compute_secret(Math::BigInt->new($pub));
>as_hex;
$g_ir_hex = $g_ir->as_hex();
$g_ir_hex_hex = pack("H*", $g_ir_hex);

print(STDERR "g_ir(hex):\n", bin_to_hex($g_ir_hex));
print(STDERR "nonce_i(hex):\n", bin_to_hex($IKEv2->[nonce_i]));
print(STDERR "nonce_r(hex):\n", bin_to_hex($IKEv2->[nonce_r]));
print(STDERR "[nonecs]);\n");

$akeyseed = hmac_sha1($r_ir, $IKEv2->[g_ike_sa][40][nonce]);
$IKEv2->[g_ike_sa][40] = $akeyseed;

print(STDERR "akeyseed(hex):\n", bin_to_hex($akeyseed));
print(STDERR "sp1_hex(\$a):\n", bin_to_hex($IKEv2->[sp1][1]));
print(STDERR "sp1_hex(\$ns):\n", bin_to_hex($IKEv2->[sp1][2]));

$keymat = prf_plus($D0 + 2 * 16 * 2 + 20 * 2, $akeyseed,
$IKEv2->[nonce_i] . $IKEv2->[ike_sa][40] . $IKEv2->[sp1][1] . $IKEv2->[sp1][2]);

print(STDERR "keymat(hex):\n", bin_to_hex($keymat));
$IKEv2->[sp1][d] = substr($keymat, 0, 20);
$IKEv2->[sp1][a] = substr($keymat, 20, 16);
$IKEv2->[sp1][ns] = substr($keymat, 40, 20);
$IKEv2->[sp1][ar] = substr($keymat, 60, 16);
$IKEv2->[sp1][er] = substr($keymat, 80, 16);
$IKEv2->[sp1][pk] = substr($keymat, 92, 20);
$IKEv2->[sp1][pr] = substr($keymat, 112, 20);

print(STDERR "pk(hex):\n", bin_to_hex($IKEv2->[sk_d]));
print(STDERR "ak_i(hex):\n", bin_to_hex($IKEv2->[sk_a]));
print(STDERR "ak_ei(hex):\n", bin_to_hex($IKEv2->[sk_ar]));
print(STDERR "ak_el(hex):\n", bin_to_hex($IKEv2->[sk_er]));
print(STDERR "ak_eri(hex):\n", bin_to_hex($IKEv2->[sk_ec]));
print(STDERR "ak_ec(hex):\n", bin_to_hex($IKEv2->[sk_ec]));
print(STDERR "pr(hex):\n", bin_to_hex($IKEv2->[sp1][p]));
print(STDERR "pr_hex(hex):\n", bin_to_hex($IKEv2->[sp1][p_hex]));

#####
# Calculate IPsec SA keys and parameters
$ipsec_params($ike_sa);

sub ipsec_params {
    my ($ike_sa, $g_ir, $j, $my_khash, $hahash);

    if ($IKEv2->[cipher] eq "null") {
        $keymat = prf_plus($D0 * 2, $IKEv2->[sk_d],
$IKEv2->[nonce_i] . $IKEv2->[ike_sa][40] . $IKEv2->[sp1][1] . $IKEv2->[sp1][2]);
    } else {
        $keymat = prf_plus($D0 * 2 + 16 * 2, $IKEv2->[sk_d],
$IKEv2->[nonce_i] . $IKEv2->[ike_sa][40] . $IKEv2->[sp1][1] . $IKEv2->[sp1][2]);
    }

    $hahash(cipher_key_out) = "";
    $hahash(auth_key_out) = substr($keymat, 0, 16);
    $hahash(prf_out) = substr($keymat, 16, 32);
    $hahash(auth_key_in) = substr($keymat, 20, 20);
    $hahash(prf_in) = substr($keymat, 24, 24);
    $hahash(auth_key_in_hex) = substr($keymat_hex, 0, 16);
    $hahash(prf_in_hex) = substr($keymat_hex, 16, 32);
    $hahash(auth_key_in_hex_hex) = substr($keymat_hex_hex, 0, 16);
    $hahash(prf_in_hex_hex) = substr($keymat_hex_hex, 16, 32);
    $hahash(auth_key_in_hex_hex_hex) = substr($keymat_hex_hex_hex, 0, 16);
    $hahash(prf_in_hex_hex_hex) = substr($keymat_hex_hex_hex, 16, 32);

    $hahash(cipher_out_hex) = bin_to_hex($hahash(cipher_key_out));
    $hahash(auth_out_hex) = bin_to_hex($hahash(auth_key_out));
    $hahash(prf_out_hex) = bin_to_hex($hahash(prf_out));
    print(STDERR "auth_out(hex):\n", bin_to_hex($hahash(auth_key_out)));
    print(STDERR "prf_out_hex(hex):\n", bin_to_hex($hahash(prf_out)));
    print(STDERR "prf_out_hex_hex(hex):\n", bin_to_hex($hahash(prf_out_hex)));
    return ($hahash);
}

## Print hash
sub print_hash {
    my ($hash, $Sindtent) = @_;
    my ($S1, $S2, $Svalue, $Sprint);

    $Sindtent = "" if (!defined($Sindtent));
    foreach $S1 (sort { $a <= $b } keys %{$hash}) {
        $Svalue = $hash->{$S1};
        if ($Sindtent eq "S1") {
            print("%s-%s-20s\n", $Sindtent, $S1);
            print("%s-%s-Value:\n", $Sindtent, $S1);
            print("%s-%s-", $Sindtent, $S1);
            print("%s-%s-Value:\n", $Sindtent, $S1);
            for ($S2 = 0; $S2 < #@$Svalue; $S2++) {
                print("%s-%s-%s\n", $Sindtent, $S1, $Svalue[$S2]);
            }
        } else {
            print("%s-%s-%s\n", $Sindtent, $S1, $Svalue);
        }
    }
}

```

```

Key Calculation
IPsec keys
Utility/debug

sub do_exchange
{
    my($ikev2, $request) = @_;
    my($proto, $Port, $Spaddr);
    my($count, $Timeout, $Rtrt, $Buf, $Snfound);
    $proto = getprotofromname("udp");
    $Spaddr = sockaddr_in($ikev2->dstport, inet_aton($ikev2->srchost));
    $Timeout = 10;
    $Rtrt = 1;
    $Buf = '';
    $Snfound = 0;
    $count = 0;
    $request .= "\r\n";
    $request =~ s/\r\n\r\n/ /g;
    vec($Rtrt, fileno(SOCKET), 1) = 1;
    while ($count++ > 0)
    {
        hexlprint("Sending packet", $request);
        if (send(SOCKET, $request, 0, $Spaddr)) {
            die "Send: $!" unless ($Rtrt & 1);
        }
        hexlprint("Received packet", $Buf);
        last;
    }
    $Timeout *= 2;
    $Timeout = 10 if ($Timeout > 10);
}
die "Timeout" if ($count < 0);
close(SOCKET);
return $Buf;
}

#####
# Get random string with given length
# $str = generate_random($ikev2, $length)
sub generate_random {
    my($ikev2, $length) = @_;
    return makerandomOctet($length => $length, Strength => 0);
}

#####
# $sum = checksum($packet);
# sum checksum
sub checksum {
    my($packet) = @_;
    my($sum, $i, $chk, $short);
    $chk = 0;
    $len = length($packet);
    $num = ($len / 2) + 1;
    foreach $short (@packgs($num), $packet)) {
        $chk += $short;
    }
    $chk += ((ord(substr($packet, -1, 1)) << 8) if ($len % 2));
    $sum = ($chk >> 16) + ($chk & 0xffff);
    $sum = ($sum >> 16) + ($sum & 0xffff);
    return (~$sum) & 0xffffffff;
}

#####
# hexlprint
sub hexlprint {
    my($Txt, $Value) = @_;
    print($Txt, "\n", bin_to_hexl($Value), "\n");
}

#####
# bin_to_hexl
sub bin_to_hexl {
    my($data, $indent) = @_;
    my($len, $S1, $S2, $S3);
    my($S4, $S5, $S6, $S7, $S8);
    $len = length($data);
    $S1 = length($data);
    $S2 = '';
    for ($S1 < $len; $1 < $len; $1 += 16) {
        $S3 = sprintf("%04Xxx:", $indent, $1);
        for ($S5 = 0; $5 < $16; $5++) {
            if ($5 == $15) {
                $S6 = substr($data, $1 + $5, 1);
                $S7 = ($S6 < 16 ? $S6 : 16) . ($S6 > 16 ? print($1) : '');
                $S8 = ($S7 < 16 ? $S7 : 16) . ($S7 > 16 ? print($1) : '');
                $S3 .= $S8;
            }
            else {
                $S3 .= " ";
            }
        }
        $S3 .= "\r\n";
    }
    $S3 .= "\n";
}
return $S3;
}

```

Do Exchange
Utility/debug

Conclusions

- IKEv2 is very small protocol when only minimal features are implemented
 - Not sure whether TLS / DTLS can be made that small
 - Our full IKEv2 implementation is 44k lines
- Certificate support would multiply the code size
 - Our certificate library is 56k lines or 81k lines if enrollment and CRL retrieval protocols are included.
- Pre-shared keys or RAW RSA keys are feasible options for authentication in this kind of use scenarios
- My draft describes those optimizations needed:
 - [draft-kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-minimal-00.txt](#)