I previously reviewed version -07.  This version (-09) is slightly updated.  I'd requested an introduction about what is different for "routing protocol security" rather than, say, an endnode authenticating to an access point.  The authors did add a sentence or so:




"

 routers need to function in order to


   establish network connectivity.  As a result, centralized services
   cannot typically be used for authentication or other security tasks;
   see Section 4.4.  In addition, routers' roles affect how new routers
   are installed and how problems are handleded;"


There's a couple of typos in the added sentences.  "routers" should be capitalized.  "Handleded" is a typo.




I don't have any objections to the document.




Radia




On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 10:02 PM, Radia Perlman 

<

radiaperlman at gmail.com

>

 wrote:




I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments.




This is a useful document as an informational RFC. The technical content is interesting and useful.

I think the document would be much improved with an introduction about what is different for "routing protocol security" rather than, say, an endnode authenticating to an access point, or nodes forming a peer relationship in an overlay network.  So, for instance, "normal security issues" (i.e., outside the scope of KARP) might assume the network is up, so that it's possible to get CRLs, or be available to be managed, whereas perhaps KARP is targetting cases which depend on less infrastructure.  It would be nice if this document were to have an introduction that talks about things like that.




As for typos...3rd line up from bottom of page 14 has a glitch involving a bunch of spaces and an extra comma after the word "peers".  And I can't parse the last sentence of the 1st paragraph of section 7. "...complexity of and update and risk...."




Speaking of PKI...the document talks about certificates expiring, but not being revoked (CRL, OCSP).

Radia